India as an Emigration Country

India’s status as a major emigration country is deeply rooted in its colonial past (Sadiq & Tsourapas, 2024) and has been dynamically shaped by globalisation and labour market transformations (Agarwala, 2022). The migration of Indian labourers during the colonial period laid the foundation for the extensive Indian diaspora observed today. Following the abolition of slavery in the British Empire in 1833-1834, a substantial demand for low-cost labour emerged across British colonies. To fulfil this demand, the British colonial administration instituted the indentured labour system (just after the abolition of slavery), a semi-coercive arrangement that operated between the extremes of slavery and free labour (Hui & Kambhampati, 2025; Jain, 1989). Under this system, a large number of Indian labourers were transported to colonies such as South Africa, Mauritius, Trinidad and Tobago, Guyana and Fiji (Khadria, 2013; Mishra, 2009; Sharma, 2024).

According to recent estimates by the MEA, the total overseas Indian population is estimated at 35.4 million, comprising 15.8 million NRIs and 19.6 million PIOs. Although NRIs are Indian passport holders residing temporarily or permanently abroad, PIOs include individuals who are not Indian citizens but whose ancestry can be traced to India. The size and regional distribution of this diaspora population are examined in detail by Jain and Prasad (2023). India’s emigrant population exemplifies transnational identities shaped by continuous interaction between origin and host societies. Migrants navigate multiple cultural, social and economic spaces, contributing to what Appadurai (1996) calls the ‘ethnoscapes’ of globalisation. Transnational migration theory provides a valuable analytical framework for understanding how migrants simultaneously maintain embeddedness in both countries of origin and destination, creating what Levitt and Glick Schiller (2004) describe as ‘transnational social fields’. These cross-border networks, sustained through kinship, technology, finance and identity, play a pivotal role in facilitating and reinforcing successive migration waves.

In the Indian context, such dynamics were structurally catalysed by the economic liberalisation reforms of the early 1990s, which opened the Indian economy to global capital flows and intensified outward migration, particularly among highly skilled professionals (Khadria, 2001; Parida & Raman, 2024). This period marked a decisive shift in India’s emigration profile: whilst earlier migrations were often associated with indentured labour or low-skilled work, post-liberalisation mobility increasingly involved engineers, doctors and IT professionals seeking opportunities in countries such as the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom and Australia. This transformation is often characterised in academic discourse as ‘brain drain’, or the loss of human capital from sending countries to more developed receiving nations (Docquier & Rapoport, 2006). However, recent literature has re-evaluated this narrative, suggesting a more dynamic process of ‘brain circulation’, in which transnational diaspora members actively contribute to the source country’s development through knowledge transfer, return migration, philanthropic activity and remittances (Docquier & Rapoport, 2012; Kapur, 2002, 2010; Saxenian, 2006; Tejada & Bhattacharya, 2014; Varghese, 2021). As global migration governance has evolved, sending states such as India have become increasingly active participants in managing and harnessing their diasporas, shaping what Gamlen (2008) characterises as the rise of the ‘emigration state’, a state that uses administrative and symbolic tools to mobilise its emigrant population for national development. Through initiatives such as Pravasi Bharatiya Diwas and Overseas Citizenship of India (OCI), the Indian government has created formal and informal ties with its diaspora, treating emigrants as assets for national development and soft power diplomacy (Kapur, 2010; Ragazzi, 2014). The subsequent global spread of formal diaspora institutions, traced comprehensively by Gamlen (2019), confirms that India’s approach forms part of a wider transformation in the governance of emigration. Thus, Indian emigration in the current era reflects not only individual aspirations and labour market logics, but also the geopolitical strategies of the state.

Emigration Trends from India to GCC Countries

Over the past few decades, Indian emigration patterns have undergone significant shifts, particularly in terms of destination countries and regions. Data for 1990-2024 illustrate a marked change in the spatial distribution of Indian emigrants. Although the absolute volume of Indian emigrants within Asia expanded from 5.3 million to 11.2 million over this period, their relative concentration within the region declined. Specifically, the proportion of Indian emigrants residing in Asia fell from approximately 81% of all international Indian emigrants in 1990 to 60.4% in 2024 (Figure 3), signalling an increasing diversification of destinations within and beyond Asia.

Figure 3. Trends Showing Indian Emigrants in Asia and Their Global Share, 1990-2024.

Source: Compiled by the author based on UN DESA 2024 data.

One of the most noteworthy trends within Asia is the growing prominence of the GCC countries, including the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait and Oman. Consisting primarily of low-skilled workers in the construction and domestic services alongside steady movement of skilled professionals, including doctors and nurses (Chanda & Sreenivasan, 2006; Khadria, 2006), the share of Indian emigrants to these nations surged substantially from nearly 36% (1.9 million) of the total Indian emigrant stock in Asia in 1990 to an impressive 74.2% (8.3 million) in 2024 (see Figure 4). This sharp increase in low-skilled labour migration from India is driven by various distress factors, including unemployment, pursuit of higher wages and poverty (Azeez & Begum, 2009; Noushad et al., 2022; Parida & Raman, 2024). The GCC countries have long relied on foreign labour, particularly from South Asia, to meet their labour demands in low-wage sectors (Kapiszewski, 2016; Wagle, 2024). As such, the Indian workforce, which has been increasingly equipped with technical and vocational skills, finds ample opportunities in the Gulf region.

In contrast, whilst the share of Indian emigrant stock in the GCC region grew, the proportion of Indian emigrants in other Asian countries fell sharply from 64% (3.4 million) in 1990 to only 25.8% (2.9 million) in 2024 (see Figure 4). This decline can be partially attributed to the weakening of historical migration as well as the reduced social networks and strained political relations in the region.

Figure 4. Trends in Indian Emigration to GCC and Other Asian Countries (1990-2024).

Source: Compiled by the author based on UN DESA 2024 data.

Specifically, the erosion of cross-border mobility between India and Pakistan, following the partition of the subcontinent and decades of political tension, has been a crucial factor in reducing emigration to Pakistan. It is also generally assumed that the subsequent generations might have weaker ties with relatives in Pakistan than the earlier generations. In 1990, nearly 53% of Indian emigrants were heading to Pakistan, a number that has since plummeted to 14.3% in 2024 (see Table 2). This change in migration patterns underscores the significant role of geopolitical factors in shaping migration trends (Hyndman, 2012; Punathil, 2025).

Within the GCC countries, Indian emigration patterns have undergone an internal reorientation over the past three decades. Until 2000, Saudi Arabia remained the primary destination for Indian migrants in the region. However, after 2000, the United Arab Emirates emerged as the dominant host country for Indian emigrants not only within Asia but also globally. This shift from Saudi Arabia to the UAE can be attributed to labour market restructuring and the diversification of economic opportunities in the Gulf (De Bel-Air, 2015; Suri & Kumar, 2020). The realignment also aligns with the UAE’s sectoral expansion into urban, service-led industries, vis-à-vis Saudi’s increasingly restrictive labour market and nationalisation (Saudisation) (De Bel-Air, 2014; Suri & Kumar, 2020). On the other hand, other GCC countries such as Qatar, Bahrain and Oman have also shown increasing trends but hosted less than 10% of the Indian emigrant population throughout the 1990-2024 period. Wagle (2024) underscores that the sustained and predictable flow of remittances is the primary motivation for Indian migration to the GCC region.

Jaeck (2022) further highlights this shift by arguing that GCC countries, which were initially more reliant on Arab migrants from culturally and linguistically similar countries such as Egypt, Jordan, Libya, Morocco, Palestine and Tunisia, gradually redirected their recruitment policies towards South Asia. GCC states have had social and political reservations about workers from neighbouring Arab countries and have also viewed South Asian migrants as more willing to work at lower wages and less likely to pose political challenges than their Arab counterparts (Gardner, 2011; Naufal, 2011; Shah, 2013). In addition to this, various studies (Chandramalla, 2022; Parida & Raman, 2024; Rajan & Saxena, 2019; Shalizi & Kumar, 2024) note that labour migration from India to the GCC countries is dominated by low-skilled, unskilled and semi-skilled migrants, with unemployment as the most commonly cited reason for migration.

Survey-based evidence points in the same direction: successive rounds of the Kerala Migration Survey show that unemployment and the search for higher earnings are the most frequently reported motives for migration to the Gulf (Rajan, 2024; Zachariah et al., 2001a), and studies of low-skilled migration to the Middle East reach similar conclusions (Rajan & Saxena, 2019). Taken together, these findings indicate that the migration of a significant proportion of Indian emigrants to the GCC countries is driven primarily by unemployment and limited earning opportunities in their places of origin, combined with restricted demand for low-skilled labour in developed regions such as North America, Europe and Oceania. This corridor thus represents the persistence of an older, employment-driven pattern of Indian emigration, against which the skill-driven reorientation documented in the following sections stands out.

Although the post-1990 period has witnessed a relative decline in the share of Indian emigration towards Asia, there has been a corresponding and substantial increase in the flow of Indian emigrants to developed regions such as North America, Europe and Oceania (see Figure 5). The differential pace at which Indian emigration grew across regions is highly instructive. Between 1990 and 2024, the Indian emigrant population grew at an annual rate of approximately 5.8% in North America, 8.4% in Oceania and 4.0% in Europe, compared with 4.4% in the GCC countries and an actual decline in the rest of Asia over the same period. This pattern is not coincidental: the destinations where Indian emigration grew at a relatively higher rate are precisely those that primarily attract skilled professionals. Khadria et al. (2022) and Walton-Roberts (2015) support this view, arguing that this migration stream consists largely of skilled professionals in STEM, including health professionals. These findings support the view that the changing geography of Indian emigration is closely associated with changes in the composition of emigrants: where Indians are moving has changed because who is moving has changed. Developed countries have institutionally reinforced this directionality by designing policies to attract skilled workers in response to demographic ageing and technology-related labour shortages, with the international mobility of highly skilled workers growing in scale and complexity as more economies participate in research, development and innovation activity (OECD, 2008). Therefore, the shift in the direction of migration can be attributed to increased demand for highly skilled labour, together with skill-selective immigration policies (Khadria, 2006; Kipp, 2025) designed to attract skilled workers in developed countries, especially in sectors such as information technology, healthcare and academia (Cerna, 2010; Kapur & McHale, 2005; Khadria, 2008; Ray, 2013; Singh, 2014). The shift can also be explained by differences in access to permanent residency. In developed countries, migrants often have opportunities to obtain citizenship and eventually reunite with their families. In stark contrast, migration to the GCC countries remains largely temporary, with little or no provision for permanent residency or formal avenues for family reunification (Bhalla, 2013; Naujoks, 2009). Parida and Raman (2024) further argue that higher skill levels may have strengthened aspirations among young migrants to seek better job opportunities in the United States, Canada, Europe and other developed countries.

Figure 5. Trends in the Percent Share of Indian Emigrants in Asia and Developed Regions, 1990-2024.

Source: Compiled by the author based on UN DESA 2024 data.

North America

The rise of a more educated, middle-class population, along with India’s emergence as a global IT hub, has facilitated greater skill-based migration to developed economies (Parida & Raman, 2024; Singh, 2014). This shift, as indicated by Beine et al. (2001, 2008), can be linked to the ‘human capital theory’, which posits that individuals with higher levels of education and skills will tend to migrate to regions that offer better returns on their qualifications. As indicated in Figure 6, a further disaggregation of Indian emigration trends to developed regions between 1990 and 2024 gives us a more detailed picture. The Indian emigrant stock in North America increased from approximately 0.6 million to 4.2 million, largely driven by migration to the United States and Canada. Similarly, Europe experienced a rise in Indian emigrants from 0.5 million to 2.0 million, whilst Oceania, primarily Australia and New Zealand, saw Indian emigrant numbers increasing from 66 thousand to over one million during the same period.

Figure 6. Trends in Indian Emigrant Stock in Developed Regions (1990-2024).

Source: Compiled by the author using UN DESA 2024 data.

A more granular analysis of Indian emigration to North America reveals a marked concentration in the United States and Canada, with migration flows significantly favouring the United States over time (see Table 3). In 1990, the United States accounted for approximately 73% of Indian emigrants in the North American region, whilst Canada accounted for approximately 27%. By 2024, the US share had modestly increased to 75.5%, whereas Canada’s share declined to 24.3%. This is likely influenced in part by Canada’s position as a secondary migration destination in the North American region (Reitz, 2013). Migration from India to Canada (particularly from Punjab) was historically dominated by low-skilled labourers, including truck drivers, taxi drivers and agricultural workers (Oberai & Singh, 1980). However, from the 1990s onwards, India experienced an educational boom, leading to a surge in highly qualified professionals migrating to the United States facilitated by the H-1B visa programme and the US’s growing reliance on global tech talent (Kapur & McHale, 2005; Saxenian, 2006; Singh, 2014; Volodin, 2022). Indian migrants in the United States today are one of the most highly educated ethnic groups, with over 77% holding at least a bachelor’s degree (31%) or an advanced degree (45%) (Im, 2025) and significant representation in STEM and healthcare sectors (Khadria et al., 2022). Moreover, whilst Canada also shifted to a points-based immigration system favouring skilled migrants, it initially attracted fewer IT professionals compared to the United States due to differences in labour market demand and sectoral development (Reitz, 2013).

Table 3. Percent Share of International Migration from India to North America.

Country/Year	1990	1995	2000	2005	2010	2015	2020	2024
USA	73.2	72.3	78.7	77.2	76.6	77.3	75.9	75.7
Canada	26.8	27.6	21.3	22.7	23.3	22.7	24.0	24.3
Others	0	0.1	0	0.1	0.1	0	0.1	0
North America total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Source: Compiled by the author based on UN DESA 2024 data.

Employment trends among immigrants in Canada since the 1970s reveal a persistent paradox, as indicated by Frenette and Morissette (2005) and Reitz (2007). Despite the increasing proportion of immigrants with higher skill levels, their representation in skilled occupations remains disproportionately low (Picot & Hou, 2020). Furthermore, earnings among skilled immigrants relative to the native-born population have declined markedly over time (Reitz, 2007, 2013). This is further supported by Crea-Arsenio et al. (2022), who argue that the decline in outcomes for immigrants, particularly those with university degrees, is frequently linked to the underutilisation of skills. This process is further exacerbated by rising demand for labour in low-wage sectors, where many highly skilled immigrants are disproportionately employed (Reitz et al., 2014). However, despite the relatively smaller presence of Indian immigrants in Canada compared to the United States, Canada remains an important destination for skilled migrants because of its immigration reforms, permanent residency pathways (IRCC, 2026) and active recruitment of international students (Alboim & Cohl, 2012). These patterns address the second research question of this study: North America has become the main destination of India’s skill-intensive emigration, even as the evidence of skill underutilisation in Canada shows that skill-selective admission does not automatically translate into appropriate employment outcomes.

Oceania

Since the 1990s, Indian emigration to Oceania, particularly to Australia and New Zealand, has increased notably. In 2024, 96.7% of international migrants in Oceania resided in just two countries: Australia and New Zealand (UN DESA, 2024). The data further indicate that Oceania currently hosts approximately 9.9 million international migrants, and India is now the second-largest source country after the United Kingdom in both Australia and New Zealand. China has also shown an increasing trend of emigration towards Oceania, although its share has begun to decline since 2015. As of 2024, over one million Indian emigrants reside in Oceania, accounting for more than 10% of the region’s total migrant population, a significant increase from 1.4% (66,000) in 1990. By comparison, the share of Chinese migrants in Oceania was 8.2% in 2024, up from 1.9% in 1990 (see Figure 7). As the growing immigrant population is primarily hosted by Australia and New Zealand, this study focuses on these two countries in particular.

The significant increase in the proportion of Indian emigrants within these two countries has had a bearing on the shift in immigration policies after 2000, from a focus on nation building and national strength to strategies that prioritise attracting skilled workers capable of contributing economically and enhancing national human capital (Benier & Corcoran, 2018; Hugo, 2004). The Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS, 2021) reports that one in every five (20%) skilled migrants in Australia was born in India (ABS, 2023). Australia in particular has become an attractive destination for Indian migrants driven by international students (mainly for the higher education sector) (ABS, 2025). Migration Data Portal (ABS, 2025) mentions that international education is a significant industry within the economies of both Australia and New Zealand. In Australia, the industry generated approximately AUD 36.4 billion during the 2022-2023 financial year, with over 590,000 international students enrolled in 2023. Similarly, in New Zealand, the international education industry was worth NZD 3.7 billion in 2019, with 72,000 student visas approved during the 2022-2023 financial year. According to the 2021 census of Australia, there were approximately 710,000 Indian born residents, comprising 9.5% of all international migrants in the country (ABS, 2022). This number has further grown to nearly 900,000 in 2024, representing close to 11% of Australia’s total immigrant population (UN DESA, 2024). Thus, India is not only the largest Asian source country but also the second-largest overall source country of immigrants in Australia after the United Kingdom.

However, the relative share of UK-born immigrants in Australia has declined sharply, dropping from 22.5% in 1996 to 12.9% in 2021 (ABS, 2021), and, according to UN DESA (2024), from 28% in 1990 to 13.6% in 2024 (see Figure 7). The decline in immigration from the United Kingdom to Australia can be explained by changes in Australia’s migration priorities, which now emphasise attracting economic migrants, especially young skilled workers from countries such as China and India. As a result, the shares of immigrants from these countries in Australia have increased relative to the United Kingdom (Phillips & Simon-Davies, 2015). Raymer and Baffour (2018) also attribute this shift to the rapidly ageing populations of the United Kingdom and other European countries.

Figure 7. Percent Share of Migrants in Oceania by Top Source Countries (1990-2024).

Source: Compiled by author based on UN DESA 2024 data.

In New Zealand, similar trends are visible. Although the overall Indian population is smaller compared to those in Australia, Indians form one of the fastest-growing ethnic communities in New Zealand. From just 1.8% of the immigrant population in 1990, Indian born migrants have come to constitute 10.2% of all immigrants in 2024, numbering approximately 150,000 individuals (UN DESA, 2024). The probable reason for this transition, as argued by Bedford et al. (2001), is the long-established tradition of out-migration by young native adults seeking overseas work and travel experience, which has subsequently resulted in an increase in skilled labour shortages, especially in the early years of the 21st century. As a result, it has increased the demand for high-skilled workers, including international students with local qualifications and experience, to address the issue of skill shortages in the country (Ho & Bedford, 2008).

Moreover, the international students in New Zealand come with the subsequent intention of applying for residence after completing studies. Among Asian nationals, Indian students have the largest proportion (26.3%) who subsequently become residents, followed by the People’s Republic of China (9.8%; Ho & Bedford, 2008). Whereas the official statistics published by the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment, Government of New Zealand (Immigration New Zealand, n.d.) indicate that during 2024-2025 the number of Indian student visas accepted was 12,473 (16.7%) of the total student visas approved. This number is the second-highest after China, for which 19,749 (26.4%) student visas were accepted. The Oceania corridor illustrates both dimensions of the transformation traced in this article. A rapid geographical diversification of Indian emigration beyond its traditional destinations, and the flow remains highly focused on students and skilled workers.

Policy Implications

The findings of this study carry significant policy implications. The persistence of large-scale low- and semi-skilled emigration from India to the GCC countries is driven primarily by unemployment at origin. Emigration in this context continues to function as a safety valve for surplus labour, a structural condition that demands policy attention. Sustained investment in skill development, vocational education and employment generation within India is necessary to widen the choices available to prospective migrants and reduce the elements of compulsion embedded in Gulf-bound migration. Complementary measures, such as pre-departure orientation, transparent recruitment channels and stronger bilateral labour agreements with GCC countries, remain indispensable for safeguarding the rights and well-being of those who continue to choose these corridors.

The expanding prominence of skill-selective destinations carries distinct implications of its own. The concentration of Indian professionals across North America, Europe and Oceania is not simply a demographic reality; it is also an underutilised policy resource. The potential for brain circulation, diaspora investment and knowledge transfer can be actively cultivated through mutual recognition of qualifications, portability of social security entitlements and structured engagement with professional diaspora networks. However, the Canadian experience serves as a caution: skill-selective migration abroad does not automatically translate into matching employment outcomes; pre-migration information services are necessary to help prospective emigrants form realistic expectations before they leave. Finally, the growing reliance of destination countries, particularly Australia and New Zealand, on international students as a primary recruitment channel, suggests that overseas education can no longer be treated as a separate market issue. Its regulation, financing and governance must be recognised as an integral and strategic component of India’s broader emigration policy.

Limitations of the Study

The UN DESA international migrant stock estimates, whilst invaluable for macro-level longitudinal analysis, carry certain inherent limitations that deserve acknowledgement. First, the dataset measures migrant stocks rather than flows, capturing the accumulated presence of migrants at a specific point in time rather than active and real-time cross-border movements. As a result, inferences about the precise timing of migration must remain approximate (Abel & Cohen, 2019). The national statistical systems in destination countries vary in how they define a migrant. Most of the countries use country of birth, but GCC countries define migrants by citizenship, which can distort diaspora estimates in opposite directions: understating stocks where naturalisation is common, and overstating them in the Gulf, where individuals born locally to Indian parents are still recorded as foreign citizens.

These estimates rely heavily on national decennial censuses, which are broad demographic exercises rather than specialised migration surveys; they frequently do not enumerate irregular, undocumented or highly mobile populations. The 10-year interval between censuses also introduces a significant temporal lag, obscuring rapid, short-term shifts in migration. To compensate for missing data, UN DESA uses demographic imputation models based on historical trends and regional patterns. Although this ensures data continuity, it also smooths the series and mutes short-run fluctuations. Consequently, these numbers are best interpreted as a conservative lower bound rather than an absolute or definitive count. These data limitations mean that minor year-to-year fluctuations should be interpreted with caution; they do not compromise the core findings of this study, as the overarching long-term trends identified in the analysis remain substantial and consistent across dataset revisions.

These constraints also provide directions for future research. Because the dataset measures stocks rather than flows, combining these stock-based estimates with flow data and administrative records from destination countries would allow a clear understanding of the timing of geographical shifts identified in this article. Additionally, since aggregate numbers homogenise the emigrant profile, a systematic analysis using the sex disaggregated components of the UN DESA dataset is crucial to isolate the gendered determinants of emigration that this study’s macro-level approach necessarily obscures. Beyond these data-specific gaps, none of these quantitative measures can capture the subjective and socio-economic realities of individual migrants, so qualitative and mixed methods research is needed to bridge statistical patterns with migrants’ lived experience.

The dual pattern of geographical dispersal and skill-intensive transformation reflects both domestic economic pressures and uneven global demand for skills. To respond effectively, Indian policymakers must prioritise investment in vocational education, skill development and employment generation within India. Migration should be a path to empowerment born out of choice and dignity, rather than a forced response to the absence of opportunities. In sum, this article contributes to migration scholarship by offering a systematic and up-to-date account of the dual transformation of Indian emigration since 1990, mapping both its geographical dispersal beyond the Gulf and its compositional shift towards skilled labour. The most valuable extension of this work would be field-based empirical research that connects these macro-level shifts to the lived experiences of migrants themselves.